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ABSTRACT 
Poland was the first East Central European nation to transfer from totalitarian rule 
to democracy.  Although resistance to the communist regime existed since 1956, it was 
not until 1980 that this transition began to develop.  Negotiations between Poland’s 
communist regime and its opposition allowed for the first free elections in East Central 
Europe in the summer of 1989 and with in months, regimes throughout the region began 
to fall.  Poland’s neighbors, Germany and the Czech Republic, immediately adopted 
policies concerning the crimes of the previous regime upon their transfer but Poland did 
not.  Poland’s failure to implement legislation concerning transitional justice led to 
almost a decade of political turmoil and infighting.  In order for an emerging democracy 
to become effective, it must separate itself from the ideals of the old regime and those 
individuals and policies that enforced its repression.   
This thesis will examine the post 1989 governments of Poland, 
Czechoslovakia/Czech Republic, and East Germany including how each of these nations 
held the criminal functionaries of the previous regime accountable, while the transition to 
a democratic state unfolded in turn in the 1990s.  It will provide insight as to why Poland, 
after legislation in 1996, is still struggling with implementation of transitional justice 
eighteen years after transition.     
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Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it. 
— George Santayana, The Life of Reason, Volume 1, 1905 
This study addresses the totalitarian past of central Europe and its impact on 
present political culture as the search for justice continues.  The Palace of Culture and 
Science in Warsaw, Poland represents the daily struggle that the nations of central 
Europe, particularly Poland, face when trying to answer the questions of their past.  
Formerly known as Joseph Stalin Palace of Culture and Science, this monstrosity of a 
skyscraper was a gift to the people of Poland from the Soviet Union in 1952.  It is a 
replica of the Palace of Soviets and the Moscow State University in Moscow built under 
Stalin’s reign.  As the highest structure in the city it keeps a watchful eye over Warsaw, 
just as the secret police did over its citizens.  The skyline of Warsaw, dominated by this 
building, offers a daily reminder of life under the vanished Communist Regime and its 
oppression of the Polish people.  Almost all other structures and monuments of the 
former regime, like the Palast der Republik in Berlin, have been destroyed.  Currently 
there are discussions as to whether this building should be torn down, or remain as a 
reminder of this horrific past. Much like the controversy of the Palace of Culture and 
Science, the question today is whether Poland should continue to struggle to make 
amends with its communist past or let its past rest and move forward. 
Many nations throughout Europe and Asia were subjugated to the authority of the 
Soviet Union and its satellite communist regimes from as early as 1921, and again in 
1944, until the fall of communism in 1989.  The citizens of these nations endured years of 
terror and oppression from the communist government and its secret service apparatus.  
Thousands were imprisoned, tortured, executed, and forced to betray their family and 
friends.  Fortunately, this reign of terror began to fall apart in 1989 as a result of 
revolution and negotiated turnovers throughout central Europe.  These nations adopted 
various means of transitional justice in order to deal with the communist leaders, secret  
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police, and their collaborators, they implemented sound legislation and then continued to 
progress past the issue of serving justice.  Such was not the case in Poland for the reasons 
examined below.   
In order to provide some sort of transitional justice in Poland, the government 
eventually adopted a system of lustration, “the process of screening groups of people for 
previous acts of collaboration under the communist regime (especially acts of 
collaboration with the secret police) and in turn disqualifying members of these groups 
from holding high-level positions in the public sector.”1   
Czechoslovakia was the first of the East Central European states to pass a law 
concerning the conduct of the Communist Party, its Secret Service, and those that 
assisted these groups.2  In 1991 Lustration Act 451 was passed and has been in effect 
since.  In accordance with the (now) Czech law, an individual assuming a position in 
public office is required beforehand to submit a request to the Ministry of Interior for 
their name to be vetted through the Secret Police files of the former regime.3  A similar 
approach was adopted in Poland, but due to a negotiated transfer of the government with 
the communists, it wasn’t until 1997 that Poland’s lustration law was passed.4  The first 
freely elected government in 1989 decided that a “Thick Line” would be drawn between 
the crimes of the previous regime and themselves.  The past should be the past and 
Poland was to move forward.   
Prior to the law in 1997, lustration and the information in the secret police files, 
was used unofficially as a tool for opposing political parties and personal retribution.  
This continued even after the law was passed.  The legislation initiating lustration had a 
ten year expiration date and in 2006 a new law was constructed by the existing 
                                                 
1 Hilary Appel, “Anti-Communist Justice and Founding the Post-Communist Order: Lustration and 
Restitution in Central Europe,” East European Politics and Societies, 19, 3, 2005, 379-405. 
2 Mark S. Ellis, “Purging the past: The Current State of Lustration Laws in the Former Communist 
Bloc.” 
3 Petra Kropackova, Personnel Security and Lustration Section, Ministry of the Interior Czech 
Republic, Interview by author, April 17, 2008, Prague, Czech Republic.. 
4 Andrew Rigby, Justice and Reconciliation: After the Violence, London: Lynne Rienner Publications, 
2001, 117-118. 
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government under President Lech Kaczynski of the Law and Justice party (PiS).  The 
proposed law was expanded to screen not only politicians and government officials for 
collaboration with the previous regime but encompassed the members of private 
organizations, the media, and the academic community.  The wide spread coverage of 
this law almost eighteen years after the fall of communism leads to the question, did 
Poland’s initial policy of the “Thick Line” delay the mental and political development of 
the nation even while it accelerated the economy? 
New legislation concerning the lustration process in Poland was introduced in 
2007.  The law requires all citizens in positions of public authority to be screened for 
former collaboration with the communist secret police during the period from 1944 to 
1989.  The new legislation covered a much broader range of individuals than the previous 
law who were now subject to the vetting process.  The release of the proposed legislation 
caused uproar in society as many protested the new requirements for journalists, 
academics, and business executives to be screened.  The new legislation would cover 
twenty-eight times the number of Polish citizens as with the previous law.  It also sparked 
a debate questioning whether this legislation was necessary seventeen years after the fall 
of communism and if it was time to move forward past the old ghosts of the past.     
This thesis will address the questions as to why, after almost twenty years, the 
Polish Government and its people are still searching for justice from collaborators of the 
former Communist Regime and how long will history be used as a weapon in Polish 
society?  Neighboring countries of both Germany and the Czech Republic dealt with their 
past swiftly allowing for the development of politically and economically strong new 
nations.  What in their history or culture allowed these nations to move forward while 
Poland continued to struggle with the implementation of transitional justice?  The cases 
of Germany and the Czech Republic will be reviewed and compared with Poland to 
provide a better understanding of these questions. 
This thesis will demonstrate that the initial government of Poland after the fall of 
the communist regime skipped an essential step in the process towards a democratic 
nation.  Like Spain, Poland initially decided to take the “amnesia” approach to 
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transitional justice.5  This thesis will also show that once legislation was finally 
introduced, it was weak and failed to provide justice to the victims of the previous 
regime.  Moreover, it did not prevent those perceived as criminals of the Polish nation 
from employment in public positions.  It is the preliminary conclusion of this thesis that 
Poland’s failure to provide some sort of break with the past tied its hands for the last 
eighteen years and allowed for instability throughout the government.  Even with the new 
legislation introduced in 2007, questions will remain unanswered until the contents of all 
files are revealed or the victims and criminals concerned have retired or passed away.        
In order for an emerging democracy to become effective, it must separate itself 
from the ideals of the old regime and those individuals and policies that enforced its 
repression.  Poland’s failure to implement legislation concerning transitional justice led to 
almost a decade of political turmoil and infighting.  Even after legislation was passed, the 
information locked in the secret police files continued to be used to control members of 
the government and assist opposition parties in their quest for political dominance.  As 
nations throughout the world shed their totalitarian past, they too will have to decide how 
their new government will confront these potential criminals and establish a functioning 
system with or without officials from the previous regime.  Researching Poland’s path to 
democracy should provide guidance for transitioning governments in the future.    
A. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis employs the case study method.  A review of the post 1989 
governments of Poland, Czechoslovakia/Czech Republic, and East Germany will provide 
three different solutions on how each of these nations held the criminal functionaries of 
the previous regime accountable, while the transition to a democratic state unfolded in 
turn in the 1990s.  To understand the decisions made in the present it is essential 
understand the past.  Although each of these nations were subject to the authority of 
Moscow and suffered from the oppression of their own secret police, particular events in 
each of their past played a major role in their future and transition into democracy.  The 
second chapter of this thesis will present an overview of the events occurring between 
                                                 
5 Rigby, 100. 
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1944 and 1989 that shaped the actions taken by these governments upon the fall of 
communism.  The system and oppression of the secret police will also be examined to 
provide an understanding as to the need for legislation concerning individuals that 
cooperated with them.   
The third chapter of this thesis will discuss the timing and process of transitional 
justice in East Germany as it united with West Germany and lustration in Czechoslovakia 
as it broke away to the Czech and Slovak Republics.  It will focus on events occurring 
from 1989 until 1991, the initial period of the establishment of democracy, and the trials 
and tribulations leading to their policies of transitional justice today.  The fourth chapter 
of this thesis will also review the events surrounding the regime turnover in Poland from 
1989, but will pay particular attention to developments in lustration in Poland leading to 
the initial lustration law in 1997.  It will assess the lustration law developed in 1997 and 
its aftermath until its expiration in 2007.  Finally, the new lustration law, proposed in 
2006, will be examined while discussing the public’s reaction and the government’s 
response to the new policies.  In conclusion, this research will provide insight as to why 
Poland today is still persecuting its people for previous ties with the former regime while 
the other nations are no longer struggling with how they will make amends with their 
past.   
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There is a vast amount of literature concerning the transition of the governments 
of East Central Europe after the fall of communism.  The majority of this literature 
focuses on the three former Warsaw Pact nations who were initially accepted into NATO, 
including the reunification of Germany.  The almost simultaneous destruction of the 
communist regimes in East Central Europe allowed for a diverse study of transitioning 
nations and their implementation of transitional justice.  Although many theories have 
developed as to the timing and approach of such implementation, the literature focuses on 
three main periods since 1989.  
The first period, and the majority of literature, focuses on the first years of 
transition in these emerging democracies and the policies concerning their past 
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implemented by the newly formed nations.  Marjorie Castle takes an in-depth look at the 
events surrounding the 1989 Round Table agreements in Poland.  The surprising outcome 
led to democracy in Poland and triggered revolutionary events throughout East Central 
Europe.6  Most of the authors in this group are in agreement that some sort of action must 
be taken against the previous regime in order for the new government to function 
efficiently.7  Ilan Berman argues that the structures of the old regime, particularly the 
secret police, must be “uprooted and neutralized” and is a “crucial step in dismantling the 
legacy of the old regime.”8  The majority of this literature concludes prior to Poland’s 
implementation of legislation in 1997.    
The next group of literature seemed to be motivated by the controversy 
surrounding Poland’s lustration law enacted in 1997.  There were many individuals in 
Poland who believed that amnesty was the best option, including former dissidents, while 
others were discouraged by the success of the old nomenklatura.9  Lavinia Stan addresses 
these issues and analyzes the application of the law, claiming that “Polish lustration was 
no lustration at all.”10  Other authors perceived this law as a step in the right direction as 
it provided truth to a society that was eager to deal with their past.11          
For those Americans who had given little thought to such things until they landed 
in their nation’s purview in the spring of 2003, the protracted course of the war in Iraq 
generated new interest on the subject of transitional justice in East Central Europe.  In 
                                                 
6 Marjorie Castle. Triggering Communism's Collapse. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003. 
7 Rigby; Tina Rosenberg, The Haunted Land. New York: Random House, Inc., 1995; Joseph 
Rothschild, Return to Diversity: A Political History of East Central Europe since Word War II. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1993.; Luc Huyse, "Justice after Transition: On the Choices Successor Elites 
Make in Dealing with the Past." Law & Social Inquiry 20, no. 1 (Winter 1995): 51-78.; Maria Los, 
"Lustration and Truth Claims: Unfinished Revolutions in Central Europe." Law & Social Inquiry 20, no. 1 
(Winter 1995): 117-161.; Noel Calhoun, Dilemmas of Justice in Eastern Europe's Democratic Transitions. 
New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004. 
8 Ilan Berman, and J. Michael Waller, eds. Dismantling Tyranny. Transitioning Beyond Totalitarian 
Regimes. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006, 154. 
9 Aleks Szczerbiak. “Dealing with the Communist Past or the Politics of the Present? Lustration in 
Post-Communist Poland.” Europe-Asia Studies, 54, no. 4 (2002): 553-572. 
10 Lavinia Stan, “The Politics of Memory in Poland: Lustration, File Access and Court Proceedings,” 
Studies in Post-Communism, Centre for Post Communist Studies, St. Francis Xavier University, 10, 2006.  
11 Appel; Natalia Letki, "Lustration and Democratisation in East-Central Europe." Europe-Asia 
Studies 54, no. 4 (June 2002): 529-552.;  
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order to provide an understanding of the effects of de-Baathification conducted by the 
Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq and develop a course of action for transitional 
justice, scholars have referred back to the transitioning democracies of 1989.  Roman 
David addresses the four types of lustration systems developed in post-1989 events 
(inclusive, reconciliatory, exclusive, and mixed), their success or failure, and the 
application of these systems in post-conflict intervention.12  Jon Elster also stresses the 
importance of understanding transitional justice of post 1989 East Central Europe in 
order to avoid the mistakes of the past when addressing issues of retribution in the future.  
As Elster and others imply, Iraq is not the “last surviving dictatorship.”13  This literature 
provides a thorough critique on the systems implemented and their outcomes fourteen to 
sixteen years later.        
Finally, the most recent literature to surface in the past few months discusses 
Poland’s newly implemented lustration law.  There is very little literature in English 
concerning this new law, but two reoccurring questions immerge.  Is this new law is a 
step backwards for Poland in its democratic process?  And is this law even necessary 
almost two decades post 1989?  Marek Safjan evaluates the new legislation and agrees 
that this legislation is necessary, but its implementation should have been addressed at a 
much earlier period in Poland’s history.14  Some authors view the new law as a 
distraction to democracy rather than a hindrance, and do not believe that democracy is 
disappearing.  People should be more concerned with the democratic process itself rather 
than promoting the destruction of the opposing political elites.15 
                                                 
12 Roman David, “From Prague to Baghdad: Lustration Systems and their Political Effects.” 
Government and Opposition 41, 3 (2006) 347-372. 
13 Jon Elster, ed. Retribution and Reparation in the Transition to Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006.; Alexander Mayer-Rieckh and Pablo de Greiff, eds. Justice as Prevention. New 
York: Social Science Research Council, 2007. 
14 Marek Safjan, “Transitional Justice: The Polish Example, the Case of Lustration” European Journal 
of Legal Studies, 2007, 1, 2. 
15 Krysztof Jasiewicz, “Is East Europe Backsliding? The Political-party Landscape,” Journal of 
Democracy, 18, 4, 2007; Jacques Rupnik, “Is East Europe Backsliding? From Democracy Fatigue to 
Populist Backlash,” Journal of Democracy, 18, 4, 2007; Ivan Krastev, “Is East Europe Backsliding? The 
Strange Death of the Liberal Consensus,” Journal of Democracy, 18, 4, 2007.  
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In summary, there is an abundant amount of literature concerning the transition of 
the East Central European states post communism in 1989.  While a majority of it focuses 
on the initial years of transition, it does provide a sufficient analysis of these events and 
their outcomes in the recent past.  However, due to the recent timing of legislation in 
Poland concerning their implementation of a new and broader lustration law, there is 
insufficient literature addressing the requirement for such legislation.   
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II. BACKGROUND 
Most of East Central Europe became newly independent states in 1918 as a result 
of the Paris suburb treaties: Versailles, Petit Trianon, and Serves.  The multi national 
empires of East Central Europe were finally dissolved, but the new states that emerged 
were weak.  “The half-century-long attempt before World War I to adopt Western 
institutions and to imitate Western development had been only partially successful even 
in the best cases, and in most cases had failed entirely.”16  Due to the absolutist society 
that lasted until World War I, East Central Europe under the Habsburgs was unable to 
progress economically and socially.  Post war experiences in the new nation-states did 
not provide for much improvement.  Democracy or not, with in twenty years these 
nations quickly found themselves occupied once again by German speaking peoples.  
This time it was the Nazis.  In 1938-1939, the Czechs and the Poles lost their 
independence.  What is now the Czech Republic became the German Protektorat 
Boehmen-Maehren and Poland was split in two between Germany and the Soviet Union.   
When the Red Army liberated East Central Europe, the reward for resistance 
against the Nazis was threefold. It began with the almost complete destruction of their 
cities, as was the case of Warsaw, which had been badly damaged in 1939 and again in 
1943.  Then came the oppression of the public.  Finally, they were blessed with another 
round of cleaning house, sweeping away intellectuals and other potential troublemakers 
directed by the Soviet occupiers.  Thousands were deported to the East.  Even the local 
communists were penalized for assisting with the resistance against the Nazis.  In the city 
of Prague, the local communist party was found guilty for beginning the liberation of the 
city on their own in the spring of 1945 and for not waiting for the entry of Soviet troops.  
These thriving and individual societies were tossed back into the dark ages as their 
property was procured and the collective lifestyle was forced upon them from Moscow.  
Moscow dug its claws into the societies and governments of East Central Europe,  
                                                 
16 Ivan T Berend, Decades of Crisis: Central and Eastern Europe before World War II, Berkeley, CA: 
University of California University Press, 1998, xxii. 
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installing puppet regimes that kneeled in submission.  The peoples of East Central Europe 
had only shaken off their Nazi tormentors to then endure Soviet puppet rule for four plus 
further decades.   
After the second World War, Europe was cut in half by the Iron Curtain, 
which was not only enslaved the people of Eastern Europe, but also 
erased the history of these people from the overall history of the 
Continent.  Europe had just rid itself of the plague of Nazism, and it was 
quite understandable that after the bloodbath of the war, few people had 
the strength to look bitter truth in the eyes, they could not deal with the 
fact that the terror was continuing in half of Europe, that behind the Iron 
Curtain the Soviet regime continued to commit genocide against the 
peoples of Eastern Europe and, indeed, against its own people.  For fifty 
years the history of Europe was written without our participation.17 
 — Sandra Kalniete, Latvian Minister of Foreign Affairs, 2004 
Life under communism throughout East Central Europe was very difficult in the 
mental and physical dimensions.  In interviews conducted with citizens of the former 
regime they explain the hardships they once faced.  Aneta was just twelve years old when 
the Communist Regime fell.  She remembers when there was nothing on the shelves of 
the local market.  “We had orange juice only for Christmas; it was sent to us from our 
relatives in Western Germany.”18  Helena recalls that a new pair of shoes would cost a 
months salary.  “When you finally had enough money and the shoes arrived in the store, 
you would rush to wait in line, maybe you would get them or maybe they would run out 
before you got to the front of the line.”  When shop owners were able to acquire goods, 
they were not sold in the shop, but used to trade for such other inaccessible items as a 
good piece of meat.19  For members of the political elite, there were hard currency special 
shops where they were able to purchase goods not available to the common citizen.  But 
these are trifling issues when it came to the generalized effects on free will and civil 
society of the Soviet system.  Children were refused medical treatments and medicines, 
                                                 
17 Krysztof Persak and Lukasz Kaminski, A Handbook of the Communist Security Apparatus in East 
Central Europe 1944-1989 Institute of National Remembrance, Warsaw, 2005, 10. 
18 Aneta Mach, Ministry of the Interior Poland, Interview by author, April 14, 2008, Warsaw, Poland. 
19 Helena Markusova, US Embassy Prague and Czech citizen, Interview by author, April 18, 2008, 
Prague, Czech Republic. 
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simple when compared to Western standards, if their parents did not belong to the 
socialist political elite or refused to collaborate.  There were different schools and 
hospitals for members of the Communist Party and the State Security Service.20  If you 
wanted education for yourself or your children you had to concede to the party.  This was 
also true for employment.  Many intellectuals refusing to be a part of the system preferred 
to work or were forced to work in area that did not employ their education.    
During the four and a half decades of darkness in East Central Europe there were 
a few periods where a ray of light shinned through bringing the peoples a moment of 
hope, but in most cases this light was shut out almost instantly by the backbone of the 
regime, the army.  The Soviet Union forced upon many of these nations their own system 
of government, developed in 1922 and subjugated upon peasants by a few educated 
intellectuals.  East Central Europe in 1945 resembled nothing of Russia in 1922.  
Resistance movements began with the working class, the foundation of the socialist 
system, shortly after the death of Stalin and Khrushchev’s “thaw” (de-Stalinization) 
began.  The first of these stirrings began in June of 1953 and spread eastward to Poland 
and Hungary in 1956.  Hungary will not be discussed in this research but it is important 
to know that in the fall of 1956, workers, students, citizens and eventually the 
government united in a revolution against Moscow and informed them of their intention 
to allow elections, withdraw from the Warsaw Pact, and claim neutrality.  Moscow 
responded with the infliction of the Red Army.21  After the invasion of Hungary, central 
Europe remained rather quiet until the attempts of world revolution in the late 1960s 
where intellectuals and workers took to the streets again.  The 1970s provided détente 
featuring the Helsinki Agreement in 1975 that was signed by all European states except 
Albania.  While Helsinki did officially recognize the current borders of Europe, it also 
guaranteed basic human rights and the “fundamental freedoms including freedom of 
thought, conscience, religion and belief.”22  The Soviet Union and other satellite nations 
                                                 
20 Pawel Piekarski, Former Director of the Office of Senator Romaszewski, Poland, Interview by 
author, April 15, 2008, Warsaw, Poland. 
21 Rothschild, 126-128. 
22 Robert Zuzowski, Political Dissent and Opposition in Poland: the Worker’s Defense Committee 
“KOR,” Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1992, 83. 
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chose to ignore the second half of the agreement.  The struggles that the three nations 
researched in this study faced over their forty plus years of oppression is essential when 
evaluating their process of transitional justice and will be reviewed in the following 
pages.      
A. POLSKA RZECZPOSPOLITA LUDOWA 
“‘Yalta’ for the Poles means that, after their army had been the first to resist 
Hitler, after Britain had gone to war in defense of Poland’s independence and Polish 
servicemen had fought courageously in defense of Britain, after some six million of their 
compatriots (one in every five citizens of the pre-war Polish Republic) had died in the 
war – after all this, their country was delivered up by the western allies, Britain and 
America, into the famously tender care of ‘Uncle Joe’ Stalin.”23  The conference at Yalta 
in 1945 granted the Soviets as protectors of the Polish nation.  Stalin promised free and 
fair elections in Poland but produced anything but.24       
The Poznan workers insurrection in 1956 was the first formal revolt against the 
regime.  The quality of life for the workers was declining along with their wages.  They 
found themselves unable to acquire basic needs such as food, clothing, and decent 
housing.25  In order to receive attention from the government, over 100,000 citizens 
marched on the 28th of June to the local People’s Council.  Representatives from Warsaw 
were not able, nor did attempt, to control the situation peacefully.  Arrests were followed 
by civil unrest that lasted two days.  In order to avoid Soviet intervention, the party 
enlisted the Polish Army to quash the insurrection.  Seventy five people were killed and 
over nine hundred were wounded.26  Following the insurrection many government 
officials were relieved from duty and in accordance with the “thaw” nationalist political 
reforms were implemented.27  What was to become known as the “Polish October” was 
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the result of Poznan.  Wladyslaw Gomulka was reinstated as the Party Secretary, after 
being ousted in 1948, and promised the workers self-management, the farmers de-
collectivization, and the church freedom to teach and practice.28    
A smaller crisis arose in 1967 during the Arab-Israeli war where Jewish students 
and intellectuals openly supported the Israeli victory (the Soviet Union supported the 
Arabs).  The secret police launched an anti-Zionist campaign and many Jews lost their 
jobs and emigrated.29  In March of 1968, students protested after they were forbidden to 
act out a traditional Polish but anti-Russian play.  Non-violent protests emerged 
throughout Poland resulting in no concessions, expulsion from Universities, jail time, and 
loss of employment for academics and intelligentsia.  The government blamed the 
students of Jewish origin as the ring leaders up this uprising, one of those students 
arrested was the future dissident Adam Michnik.30   
In 1968 as the students and intellectuals protested the majority of the workers 
stood by refraining from involvement.  The students and intellectuals in 1970 returned the 
favor.  Just a week shy of Christmas in 1970 the Polish government decided to increase 
the price of food by 36%.31  On 14 December, workers in the Gdansk Shipyard 
immediately protested.  Over three thousand workers marched the streets, but unlike in 
1956, these protestors turned to attacking government buildings.  The government 
retaliated with force and many workers were killed.  The following day over ten thousand 
marched the streets in Gdansk and more were killed.  On 16 December, workers were 
shot outside the gate of the shipyard.32  Within four days over a hundred factories were 
on strike.  Gomulka was relieved of his duties as Party Secretary and replaced by Edward 
Gierek the next day.  Negotiations between the party and the workers were concluded in 
February of 1971 with a reduction of food prices.33           
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Living conditions improved and Poland experienced an economical boom.  This 
boom can be attributed to détente and the funds provided by the West.  Eventually the 
loans had to be repaid and the situation in Poland in the late 1970s began to deteriorate.34  
The workers again protested and many of them were arrested.  Intellectuals joined the 
fight and developed the Workers’ Defense Committee (KOR) to legally and financially 
assist those arrested and their families.  KOR activists were also arrested but were 
rescued by ‘Helsinki’ and détente when all prisoners were released prior to the arrival of 
President Carter in 1977.  KOR became the “bridge” between the workers and the 
intelligentsia and was the foundation for the rise of Solidarity in 1980.35    
In 1980, something unique happened in Poland.  Workers, students, intelligentsia, 
clergy and farmers joined together in protest against the government.  They found unity 
in Solidarity.  Through a 17,000 persons strike in Gdansk in August of 198036, the 
government conceded to Lech Walesa, leader of the Gdansk movement, and signed an 
agreement for workers wage increases, reduction in prices of consumer goods, the legal 
right to strike, and the right to form trade unions.37  Due to the strike, Solidarity was 
legally formed in 1980 as a trade union that had its foundation in KOR and the 1970 
strikes in Gdansk.  Originally attempting to steer clear of politics, focusing solely on civil 
society, Solidarity was forced to get involved.38  Solidarity became a mass movement 
with almost 10 million members from throughout Polish society.39  This movement 
supported unions throughout the nation and negotiated for them directly with the Polish 
government.  When their demands were not met, they had the power to implement a 
nation-wide strike.40  The movement did not last as Prime Minister Jaruzelski believed 
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“there is no place for two authorities within one state.”41  In December of 1981, he 
declared martial law.  Within hours the leaders of Solidarity, trade unions, and other 
opposition movements were arrested and the organizations were outlawed.  Those who 
were not arrested went underground.  As Solidarity was a non-violent organization, there 
was minimal resistance.42 
“When attacked, they (Polish) defended themselves; physical violence was 
usually met with physical defense regardless of one’s chances, since the point was not so 
much to win as to ‘give testimony’.  To give testimony, in this context, is to state that one 
prefers death in a struggle to life in bloodless surrender.  To surrender without a fight was 
until then a disgrace for Poles; it was considered unmanly and cowardly behavior.”43  
Throughout the years of “occupation,” the citizens continued to fight against the 
oppressive regime, just as they had in 1944 against the Nazis.  Beginning with Poznan in 
1956, there remained a constant dialog between the leading dissident 
organizations/workers unions and the government.  This proved beneficial when 
Gorbachev attempted to implement his policies of glasnost and perestroika and the Polish 
government entered negotiations with Solidarity in 1989.    
B. CESKOSLOVENSKO 
While Hungary and Poland were revolting against the Soviet regime in 1956, 
Czechoslovakia at least in appearance remained a strong supporter of the Soviet 
apparatus with an adherence to Stalinist power even after his death.  In contrast to 
Poland, the Czechs and Slovaks enjoyed economic growth and the nation was relatively 
stable.  There was no struggle to define or alter the communist system as in other nations 
during Nikita Khrushchev’s “thaw.”  In fact, Czechoslovakia’s First Secretary Antonin 
Novotny saw “de-Stalinization” as “being synonymous with weakness and yielding to the 
forces of reaction.”44  Novotny’s Stalinist ideals were in opposition to Khrushchev’s 
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policies, allowing for the Slovak Communists under Alexander Dubcek to pressure for 
reforms without the wrath of Moscow.  The mid 1960s saw a few reforms concerning the 
economy and government but failed to meet the expectations of the members of the party 
that opposed Novotny, the intellectuals, and the students.  By the end of 1967 
Czechoslovakia found itself immersed in civil unrest.  The party was divided, and 
students and intellectuals were openly resisting the regime and demanding change.  
Within the first month of 1968 Brezhnev backed Dubcek’s reform program and replaced 
Novotny.45           
During 1968 protests sparked and attempted revolutions ensued around the world.  
In France, Germany, China, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the United States, students and 
intellectuals took to the streets to voice their discontent with their governments. 
Czechoslovakia embraced this revolution as Dubcek planned for reforms that would jump 
start the economy and the party.  Censorship was abolished, trade unions were developed, 
and the party structure was altered.  His reforms of “socialism with a human face,” were 
widely received across the nation. 46  Speaking with one individual who was a student 
during the Prague Spring, her face lights up as she remember what the feeling was like 
being part of the movement.  “Many people were proud and had hopes for Prague 
Spring.”47  Prague Spring “aimed to build a more utopian society based on shared needs,” 
a class-less society of workers and intellectuals that was neither capitalist nor 
communist.48   
Dubcek received support from Moscow in his reforms, but with caution.  
Brezhnev was concerned with the fast pace of reforms and finally called upon Dubcek to 
regain control of the population.  Intellectuals began to openly criticize the government 
and published the “2,000 words” document which “called on the people to take the 
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process of liberalization into their own hands and away from the party.”49  Dubcek called 
to the people for a combined effort to improve the party and implement reforms, he even 
promised elections by a secret ballot.50             
Unfortunately, Czechoslovakia’s neighbors in Poland, East Germany, and the 
Ukraine were not happy with the internal political movements that were occurring.  The 
freedom of the press was starting to cross over the borders and began to threaten their 
government.  Czechoslovakia’s neighbors were afraid of these revolutionary ideas poring 
over into their states.  They pleaded to Moscow to control Dubcek who refused to take 
action against his citizens.  Brezhnev could no longer stand by as he watched the people 
of Czechoslovakia attempt to dissolve the Communist Party.51  The armies of the 
Warsaw Pact nations invaded Czechoslovakia in August of 1968 as a “nominal 
undertaking of the ‘fraternal’ Warsaw Pact in response to an appeal from loyal Czech 
Communists.”52  The Soviet Union could not afford to allow this “ideologically 
dangerous and politically contagious” process to continue.53  Moscow managed to quash 
the reforms and beat the Czechoslovak people into submission.  Dubcek was forced to 
roll back the reforms and the Soviet troops remained in country.   
Overwhelmed with defeat, the people removed themselves from public life and 
fell under a policy of “internal emigration” where they focused on their family and home 
life.  Even prominent Communists were asked to sign an affidavit if claiming that they 
“agree with the fraternal assistance of the Warsaw Pact.”  If they refused or use the words 
“occupation” they were persecuted and often jailed.  Many of these communist turned 
into dissidents.54  But mostly, the Czechoslovak people lost all hope of a free society.   
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It was not until a small rock group, “The Plastic People of the Universe,” was 
arrested and put on trial that the Czech peoples took notice.55  In 1975, the 
Czechoslovakian government became a signatory to the Helsinki agreement and the 
United Nations’ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.56  The arrest of the rock 
band and other political prisoners after 1975, violated the freedoms outlined in these 
agreements.  The people of Czechoslovakia were tired of standing by quietly as they had 
done since 1968.  The voices of workers, intellectuals, and students were implemented 
into Charter 77; “a combination of a statement, a petition, and a declaration of intent” that 
documented “grievances and suggested remedies” against and for the government.57  
Vaclav Havel, signatory of Charter 77, claimed that, “not standing up for the freedom of 
others meant surrendering one’s own freedom.”58  Charter 77 addressed the violations of 
the freedoms guaranteed by the UN covenants and the Helsinki agreement by the 
Czechoslovakian government; freedom of expression, right to education, freedom of 
information and public expression, freedom of religious confession, the leading role of 
the party, right to leave the country, right to establish trade unions and the right to strike, 
and other violations of rights and duties by the police.59  These grievances, with over 800 
signatories, were presented to the government and Federal Assembly.60  The government 
responded with persecution; arrests, imprisonment, loss or reassignment of employment, 
denial of higher education to their children and forced emigration.61  The peoples of 
Czechoslovakia once again fell into submission until the mid 1980s. 
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C. DEUTSCHE DEMOKRATISCHE REPUBLIK 
“Unlike Eastern Europe, where Leninist regimes were installed by sheer force, 
communism in Germany appeared as a positive ‘moral option’ that seemed to draw the 
adequate lesson from the defeat of Nazism.”62  The new anti-fascist East German state 
drew in many Germans that were excited about the possibility to participate in this new 
state that separated itself from its past and provided hope for the future.63  Since the 
founding of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in October of 1949 resistance and 
dissent to the communist regime was minimal.  Upon the death of Stalin in 1953 political 
unrest was emerging throughout East Central Europe.  In East Germany large riots broke 
out of workers protesting food rationing, salary, and work conditions on 17 June 1953.64  
Over five hundred thousand workers protested throughout East Germany (100,000 in 
Berlin) in one day.  These riots were immediately and harshly suppressed by the 
government with the assistance of the Red Army and close to fifteen hundred protestors 
were sent to prison.65  This was and remained the only significant public unrest that 
occurred during the forty year history of the GDR until the summer of 1989, although 
small resistance groups had developed in the late 1970s.   
After the forced annexation and assimilation to the Soviet Union, with 
streamlined one-party systems and Stalinist terror, followed the cautious 
reassertion of national independence, forging a kind of community of 
destiny between the national communist rulers and their subjects.  In 
nationless East Germany, the demarcation line between mobilization and 
post-mobilization had to be less clear-cut.66   
The closure of the borders in and out of East Germany assisted in the control of dissenters 
and nonconformists.  Dissent organizations were minimal and unorganized.  Disgruntled 
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citizens were kept in line with consumer goods, bought from western deutschemarks and 
those that could not be bought off by the Stasi were either exiled or imprisoned.67 
East Germans enjoyed one of the highest standards of living in the Eastern Bloc, 
symbolized by the availability of consumer goods and vacations to the Black and Baltic 
Sea.  They had an advanced economy and a thriving industrial sector while other nations, 
such as Bulgaria, were forced to export their natural resources to them in return for 
machinery.68  The East German military (NVA) sought to be the finest Warsaw Pact 
army and in 1956 they joined the Warsaw Pact.  The NVA also participated in the 
invasion into Czechoslovakia in 1968.  East Germany was a model state for those of the 
Eastern Bloc to mirror.  Did the GDR lack significant dissent movements because the 
people were living in this model of utopian society?  Or was fear and intimidation 
installed at such an early stage of the development of the nation that the ideas of freedom 
of expression and thought became implausible?   
Shortly after the end of the war, Soviet security services and East German 
Communists swept up thousands of ex Nazis and other citizens who voiced their 
opposition to the soviet occupation and the installation of the socialist unity regime.  The 
Social Democratic Party was forcibly merged with the German Communist Party in 
1946.  All of those that opposed were arrested.  Many of those arrested were sent to the 
former SS run concentration camps of Sachsenhausen and Buchenwald and to Soviet 
Labor camps for up to twenty-five years with a sham of a trial, or no trial at all.  A 
majority of these arrests in the years after the war were conducted by political police 
known as the Kommissariat 5 which was established by the Soviet occupiers.  Up to 
180,000 Germans were arrested during this period from 1945 to 1949.  Of those 65,000 
perished and 36,000 were confined to Soviet gulags.  In February of 1950 the Ministry  
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for State Security (MfS), or the Staatssicherheit (Stasi), was founded.69   This was the 
beginning of the reign of terror that would prevail over the citizens of the GDR for the 
next forty years.                  
D. THE SOVIET CHEKIST SYSTEM 
The Conference of Yalta in 1945 sealed the fate of the peoples of Eastern Europe.   
Germany was divided and Poland was under Soviet control.  From the Baltic Sea 
to the Adriatic, Europe was divided in half with the occupation of Soviet troops in the 
East.  Puppet regimes from Moscow were installed in Eastern Europe across from East 
Germany to the Black Sea.  At the heart of Soviet Communism stood its protector, the 
security apparatus or secret police.  As Communist regimes gained power throughout the 
Soviets assisted with the installation and training of each state’s security apparatus, 
modeled after the NKVD (the People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the Soviet 
Union).  Its mission was very clear: protect the party and destroy any “opponents of the 
new order.”70    
The secret or political police infiltrated every sector of public and private life 
during the second half of the twentieth century throughout Russia and Eastern Europe.  
These organizations, described as an “octopus,”71 subdued their own citizens through 
fear, blackmail, and sometimes arrests and torture.  Every year that passed under the 
communist regime the secret police grew stronger and their networks grew larger.  
Agents were operating in almost every known organization in the country.  Through 
effective training and advance technologies, such as recording devices, the secret police 
were almost unstoppable.72  “Wherever two or three are gathered together, there the 
Party-state desires to be.”73  The most well known groups of the secret police were the 
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KGB and the Stasi.  The next few pages will discuss the Stasi and the state security 
apparatuses in Poland, the Sluzba Bezpieczenstwa, and the Statnibezpecnost in 
Czechoslovakia.   
STAATSSICHERHEIT 
The sole existence of a separate Germany was justified by socialism.  East 
Germany was the border, or the front line, of socialism against capitalism, good versus 
evil.  In order to defend the good, East Germany needed an army of ideological enforcers, 
the Stasi.  “The gargantuan size of its secret police apparatus attests, the GDR was the 
ultimate combat regime of the Soviet hemisphere.”74  Legislation passed by the 
Volkskammer, the East German parliament, concerning the MfS stated that “the most 
important tasks of the Ministry will be to protect the national enterprises and works, 
transport and national property from plots of criminal elements as well as against all 
attacks, to conduct a decisive fight against the activities of hostile agents networks, 
subversives, saboteurs and spies, to conduct an energetic fight against bandits, to protect 
our democratic development and to ensure an uninterrupted fulfillment of the economic 
plans of our democratic free economy.”75   
The MfS was developed from models of the KGB and the Gestapo, therefore “had 
arguably the best control of any state in the East.”76  This was essential as the DDR daily 
faced the evils of the West.  They were the front line of socialism and the protector of the 
party from within and considered themselves to be the “shield and the sword of the 
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public, private, and social institution in the state.  They enforced a strict adherence to the 
rule of law on their populace.  In addition to internal infiltration, the MfS were present in 
every single West German ministry.78       
The MfS got off to a rocky start by failing to prevent the first major uprising in 
Central Europe in 1953.  After cleaning house, and under the leadership of Lt Gen Erich 
Mielke, the Stasi’s power increased and assumed responsibilities over the military, 
foreign espionage, and the border patrol.79  The old methods of torture and continuous 
interrogations were decreased and arrests were limited to prevent civil unrest while 
intelligence, especially surveillance, became the main tool for state oppression.  The 
postal system was monitored by the MfS inspecting letters and packages daily.  Phones 
were tapped, living spaces and work places were bugged, and cameras were installed.80 
Repression of GDR citizens was limited by the international agreements on human rights 
and also was under close watch from its capitalist half.81  Through the gathering of 
information and the assistance of “unofficial informers” or collaborators, citizens were 
legally arrested and tried with sufficient “evidence.”  Almost all of the guilty succumbed 
to mental or “white torture” and confessed their “crimes.”82  This preventive surveillance 
assisted to maintain relative peace and proved successful during the summer of 1968 
when only 2100 citizens, sympathetic to the Prague Spring, protested in the GDR.83                
The “main weapon in the fight against the enemy”84, the Inoffizielle Mitarbeiter 
(IM) or unofficial colleagues (collaborators), was an average citizen that believed in the 
protection of their “peace-loving state” and considered informing to be a “responsible 
activity.”  Others were members of the opposition that were blackmailed or individuals 
that knew that the Stasi could assist them in acquiring goods or services or provide 
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advancement in their careers.85  Through the use of IMs the MfS was able to infiltrate the 
most critical social institutions, intellectual organizations and the church.86   A large 
majority of intellectuals remained loyal to the GDR from the beginning, but surveillance 
was still required for the few non state supporters attempting to publish critical works in 
the West.87  In some organizations every fourth member was working for the MfS.88  The 
church was “the only social institution which remained ideologically estranged from the 
system,” and by 1989 over 800 IMs resided in the Church body.89   
It was also very common for family members to report on each other.  Much like 
the Hitler Youth, students were encouraged to report anti-state activity occurring in their 
home.  One East German dissident, Gerd Poppe, learned of Stasi attempts to turn his 
family against him when reviewing his file after 1989.  As per Stasi order, the school his 
son attended ensured that the boy received socialist teachings with a “positive influence” 
in order to demonstrate the “uselessness of their hostile activities” (parents).  The Stasi 
also contacted his wife, Ulrike Poppe, a human rights activists, and planned to: “To 
encourage Ulrike Poppe in her current intention to separate from her husband, suggest 
that if she were to drop all her public activities and stop cooperating with the enemy, she 
might be able to embark on a program of advanced studies. She should be encouraged to 
believe that if she separates from her husband, she will be financially secure. The travel 
ban could be eased to allow travel to socialist countries.  To exacerbate the marriage 
crisis, contact person ‘Harald’ will be introduced to Mrs. Poppe with the aim of 
establishing an intimate relationship.”90   
Upon the collapse of East Germany in 1989 there were over 91,000 employees of 
the MfS.  This numbers far exceeds that of East Germany’s neighboring Warsaw Pact 
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nations and equals approximately one employee per 180 citizens.91  This was also 
significantly larger than the Gestapo92 which was responsible for policing the whole of 
Germany and its occupied territories.  From the beginning of the MfS, IMs were 
incorporated into the security apparatus.  Starting with less than 10,000, by 1989 there 
were 174,000 registered collaborators working for the Stasi.93  This number also far 
exceeds that of any of East Germany’s fellow socialist states.  Due to the small size of 
East Germany, the ratio of MfS employees and IMs to the number of citizens is also 
incomparable to the other neighboring states. 
SLUZBA BEZPIECZENSTWA 
As in Germany prior to the end of the war, thousands of Polish citizens were 
arrested by the NKVD and local communist security services.  Many of those arrested 
belonged to the Home Army, which fought against Hitler’s Nazi Army, or resistance 
fighters that were not part of the communist party.  Initially formed by the NKVD from 
the members of the People’s Army and a few who served in the Soviet Special Forces, 
the members of the security apparatus were young and uneducated individuals who relied 
on brute tactics and lacked any sort of moral fiber.  Thousands of these young agents 
were charged with theft, rape, drunkenness, lawlessness, and collaborating with the anti-
communist underground.94  Those that were arrested were subjugated to torture, beatings 
and humiliation in order to obtain confessions.95  The “thaw” produced political unrest 
throughout Poland in 1955 and 1956.  Many of the agents of the secret police refused to 
collaborate.  The security apparatus collapsed failing to prevent the uprisings of the 
“Polish October” in 1956.  With in a month, the old system was abandoned and the SB 
was formed.96 
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The Sluzba Bezpieczenstwa (SB) was established in 1956 under the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs.  It replaced the old Ministry of Public Security, and was tasked to 
“protect the democratic people’s system established by the Constitution of the Polish 
People’s Republic and the national interest against enemy espionage and terrorist 
activity.”97  The SB consisted of many departments: intelligence, counterintelligence, 
combating hostile activity and organized opposition, surveillance of religious 
organizations, industry, transport, communication and farming, operational technology, 
correspondence control, radio counter-intelligence and protection of the party 
leadership.98       
These departments employed many of the same instruments of surveillance as the 
Stasi in the GDR.  A large percentage of correspondence passing through the post office 
was inspected daily, especially during periods of civil unrest.  Eavesdropping through the 
use of phone taps, bugs, and photography was utilized.  But where the SB got the most 
‘bang for their buck’ was through the use of secret collaborators.99  Within the SB there 
were three types of collaborators; the tajny wspolpracownik (TW), those “formally 
recruited by the SB,” the kontakt poufny (KP/KO), short-term confidential contacts, and 
the kontakt sluzbowy (KS), official contacts, “people who provided the SB with 
information in connection with their managerial or executive functions.”  Only the TW 
signed a contract with the SB.100  The number of TWs throughout Poland after 1956 
remained minimal (average 10,000) until civil unrest surfaced in 1968/1970, where the 
number almost doubled.  The number of TWs recruited continued to increase to over 
30,000 by the time Martial Law was implemented in 1981.101  SB personnel and TWs 
attempted to infiltrate every civil organization in Poland.  They impeded the development 
of a peasant trade union, attempted to “disintegrate the clergy,” lead student protestors 
into the hands of the SB, and turned or discredited opposition leaders.  Solidarity, 
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founded in 1980, was the only organization they were unable to effectively influence.102  
After 1956, the use of force was not as frequent in the SB and they relied on arrests and 
harassment (detention, searches, loss of employment, confiscation, fines) to control the 
population.103            
“By 1989, the SB had become one of the most important power structures in the 
Polish State.”104  In 1988 there were 98,000105 working informers in Poland.106  This 
number was in one single year alone, and tripled in eight years from the number of 
collaborators in 1980.107  After forty-four years of collaboration there were hundreds of 
thousands of collaborators.  Each individual had their own reason to collaborate with 
many of them not knowing that they were actually hurting anyone.   
STATNIBEZPECNOST  
In the struggle against the German occupiers of World War II, the democrats and 
communists united together forming a “National Front” coalition government.108  Unlike 
in Poland, where the Soviets were viewed as ‘occupiers’, the Czech and Slovak people 
had always perceived Russia and the Soviet Union as the saviors of the Slavic people.109  
Their assistance in ridding the nation of the German aggressors was welcomed.  But what 
the Czechs and Slovaks did not expect was the “seizure of power” that followed.  The 
communists gained full control of the government through “free elections” in February 
1948.110  The National Security Corps (SNB) was initially established in 1945 and 
divided into three sections: independent criminal, intelligence, and state security (StB).  
Shortly after the communists gained control of the government, the StB became 
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autonomous of the SNB in order to better “prosecute political or class enemies, including 
the ‘struggle’ against Western influence.”111  As in Poland and East Germany, the state 
was cleansed of non-communists resulting in closure of newspapers and periodicals, and 
the purging of “universities, professional bodies, sports clubs, the publishing industry, 
and the civil and military services.”112  Those who were “cleansed” were executed or sent 
off to one of the 422 forced labor and prison camps.  Many did not receive a trial.113        
As the StB was established under the supervision of the KGB, operationally it 
resembled the Stasi and SB.  Like those institutions it also held executive and 
investigative powers, which included the ability to make arrests, conduct interrogations, 
search homes and offices, and prosecute its victims.114  In the early stages of the StB, 
members also used physical and mental violence to interrogate their prisoners.  They 
were “beaten in the face with a rubber hose, beaten with a truncheon all over their body,” 
forced to stand continuously as they were interrogated, allocated minimal and interrupted 
sleep, and their families were also threatened.115  One Czech citizen recalls his arrest by 
the StB, “the welcoming I got in Plzeň was terrible. At that time, you didn’t know who 
was kicking you. They bashed out all your teeth and left you lying in a pool of blood. But 
somehow I expected it.”116   
The instruments of the StB’s trade were also very similar to the Stasi and SB, 
relying on surveillance but with limited electronic capabilities.  But in Czechoslovakia, 
unlike in Poland and East Germany, correspondence received much more attention.  The 
StB developed a registry of names and addresses of those who either sent or received 
foreign mail, over three million names and addresses were tracked.  Usual inspection of  
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correspondence to and from suspected criminals or dissenters was also conducted 
daily.117  The most important method of intelligence gathering still remained the 
individual collaborator.   
The brutal tactics used early on in the StB were replaced by mental influence.  
The StB employed their agents and collaborators throughout governmental agencies, 
public institutions, the church, private institutions, and social organizations.  They used 
their influence to control these organizations through top management or mislead social 
organizations by providing false information and attempting to turn the members against 
each other.118   After the network disintegrated in the summer of 1968, it managed to 
recover concluding with a total of almost thirty thousand collaborators by the end of 
1989.119  This of course was no comparison to the size of the networks in Poland or East 
Germany which could be attributed to the minimal dissident activity after 1968.               
THE CITIZEN – TOOL OF THE STATE 
Many nations throughout the world have a “special” sector within their 
government to address enemy espionage and terrorist activities; in the United States we 
have the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation and now a 
Department of Homeland Security.  Pointedly, the KGB, Stasi, and SB differed, in the 
crucial dimension that they were organizations of a totalitarian political party, without 
any checks and balances.  These organizations would not have been successful if it was 
not for the network of collaborators who were recruited over the years.   
According to Andrew Rigby, author of Justice and Reconciliation and director of 
the Centre for the Study of Forgiveness and Reconciliation at Coventry University in the 
United Kingdom, under the German occupation of Europe there were four types of 
collaborators in the Nazi New Order.  The traitor: “unconditional collaboration for 
private gain,” the accommodationist: “collaboration in order to survive,” the patriotic 
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traitor: “collaborationist in service of the occupier’s cause,” and the conditional 
collaborator: “to serve the wider community.”120  All of these definitions can be 
generalized to apply to the citizens of Eastern Europe and their collaboration with the 
secret police during the Communist Regime.  Individuals were recruited to collaborate 
based on their ability to provide information on certain individuals or organizations.  
Many citizens’ profession provided insight for the secret police, such travel agents who 
turned in lists of names of clients seeking travel.121  Many of the collaborators were 
blackmailed while others were offered money, goods, services, and travel as a reward for 
their information.  Recruited collaborators were also only employed for a certain period 
of time only when they could provide required information.122  In almost every 
organization, dissident or not, there was an informer.  Their network infiltrated every part 
of the society and government.  Young adults informed on their friends and family.  
Citizens informed on their co-workers and friends.  Wives reported on their husbands and 
vice versa.  Thousands of dissidents were arrested based upon information produced by 
these collaborators.  Even those dissidents that were victims of collaboration became 
collaborators themselves for one reason or another.   
 We are all in this together – those who created this regime; those who 
accepted it in silence; and all of us who subconsciously became 
accustomed to it.  — Vaclav Havel123 
It is understandable that one would want to protect their family and compromise 
with the powers of party and state to do so.  But the worst of these collaborators were 
those individuals who were not fortunate to be a part of the socialist elite, but still wanted 
to live like them.  They assisted the secret police in any possible way to obtain benefits 
for their own selfish needs and to get ahead in public life. 
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III. THE CZECH REPUBLIC AND GERMANY POST 1989 
Unlike Poland, East Germany and Czechoslovakia’s hardliner regimes ignored 
Gorbachev’s policy of glasnost in the late 1980s.  They were the economic powerhouses 
of the socialist system and did not view these new reforms as necessary to their states.124  
But as Poland initiated its Round Table Talks and elections in 1989, protests erupted in 
East Germany and Czechoslovakia.  Public dissent and student demonstrations emerged 
throughout the summer.  Upon the fall of the wall in Berlin, the people of Czechoslovakia 
once again marched the streets of Prague.  In less than three weeks the Czechoslovakian 
Communist government folded.  By the end of the year they handed over the keys of the 
nation to the leader of the opposition, Vaclav Havel.  This bloodless turnover was to be 
known as the “Velvet Revolution.”125           
A. VELVET REVOLUTION 
Many argue that the Velvet Revolution was not a negotiated transfer of power 
thereby allowing for swift legislation against the communists and their collaborators.126  
The newly formed government consisted of many former communist who still were 
holding the same positions before the revolution.  These individuals were required to help 
keep the government afloat while in transition.  Czechoslovakia was the first East Central 
European state to pass legislation concerning “decommunization,” but it wasn’t until 
almost two years later in October of 1991 that this occurred.127  Initially, Havel and 
others were against such legislation.  Many leaders of the opposition and new 
government were active dissidents who after spending years in jail had a complete 
understanding of the operations of the secret police and their influence over the people.   
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When I talk about a decayed moral environment…I mean all of us, 
because all of us have become accustomed to the totalitarian system, 
accepted it as an inalterable fact and thereby kept it running. In other 
worlds, all of us are responsible, each to a different degree, for keeping the 
totalitarian machine running. None of us is merely a victim of it, because 
all of us helped to create it together….We cannot lay all the blame on 
those who ruled us before, not only because this would not be true but also 
because it would detract from the responsibility each of use now faces.128 
(Vaclev Havel 1990) 
One month after Havel made his New Years speech (noted above), the StB was 
dismissed and the Ministry of the Interior sealed their archives. 129  Agents were directed 
to infiltrate the government and media, obtaining positions that would facilitate the 
“counterrevolution.”130  Those security personnel requesting to return to the new security 
service were permitted only after being screened for past atrocities.  The Ministry of 
Interior who continued to maintain the secret police files conducted the screening 
process.  Many of these same agents were permitted to reoccupy “top executive 
positions.”131  Surprisingly many files disappeared or were destroyed during this 
period.132     
Within a year of the files being sealed a “wild lustration” emerged.  Individual 
political parties, minus the communist party, screened their members for connections 
with the secret police and members of the parliament were also vetted for past ties with 
the former regime.  The Ministry of the Interior, whom the StB fell under during the 
previous regime, conducted the screening process.  Names of agents and collaborators 
were made public knowledge. Many of those individuals accused denied the claims 
against them and others refused to resign their positions.133  Names were also 
mysteriously leaked to the public resulting in political consequences.  “Prague is filled 
with rumors, gossip, suspicion and fear, much of it based on false information from the 
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StB files…Immediately after the revolution a number of people somehow found ways to 
see their own and other people’s files and were able to photocopy them and even destroy 
them.”134  The need for some sort of official lustration was supported by over 80% of the 
population.135         
B. CZECH LUSTRATION 
After almost a year of wild lustration, the Czechoslovakian National Assembly 
passed legislation in October of 1991.  The Lustration Act banned “former Communist 
officials and collaborators of the Secret Police” from: 
holding positions in the state administration at both the federal and the 
republican levels; the Czechoslovak Army (the rank of colonel and 
higher); the federal Security and Information Service; the federal 
intelligence agency; the federal police; the Office of the President; the 
Office of the Federal Assembly; the Office of the Czech National Council; 
the Office of the Slovak National Council; the offices of the federal, 
Czech and Slovak governments; the offices of the federal and republican 
Constitutional Courts; the offices of the federal republican Supreme 
Courts; and the Presidium of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences; … 
top positions in Czechoslovak, Czech and Slovak Radio and Television; 
… the Czechoslovak Press Agency; … top management positions in 
enterprises and banks owned by the state; to top academic positions at 
colleges and universities, and to judges and prosecutors.136  
This system requires every person to be vetted prior to fulfilling positions in 
which the new law requires review for.  If the individual is found to have any connection, 
they are barred from holding the public positions previously mentioned.  Of those that 
applied, only about 5% of the requests returned were “positive” for collaboration.137  
There were very few people who actually lost their jobs.  In many cases these individuals 
were just assigned to a lower position of authority that did not require a negative 
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response.  Although originally the law applied to anyone filling the positions of authority 
was screened, the law was amended in 2000 to include only individuals that were born 
after December 1, 1971.138         
Although the Czech system has been cited by many in the transitional justice field 
as the model in the east, there were many people who doubted the lustration system.  In 
the beginning of the transition, there were many former communists that had infiltrated 
the new government under the guise of dissidents.  These former StB agents and 
communist party members used each other to obtain false certificates and present an 
“alternative file” for screening.139  Over 90%140 of the files were destroyed and it was 
difficult for courts to prove that an individual was not a collaborator even after that 
individual received their positive certificate.  It did encourage those that were guilty to 
leave civil service, but many of them gained employment in private companies where 
their salaries were much higher.141  Polls conducted in the first few years of lustration 
concluded that over 56% of those surveyed still supported the removal of the former 
communist from the government.142      
Five years after the initial lustration law was passed, new legislation in 1996 
opened the files for the victims.  In 2002 this legislation was adjusted to give members of 
the public visibility of the files.  It also incorporated institutions such as the Ministry of 
Defense who created a “Document Disclosure Authority” which allowed these victims to 
apply and view the files that military intelligence may have kept on them.143    
On of the problems with the files is that up until 2006 the files were kept under 
the control of the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Defense, and the Ministry of 
Interior.144  Many files were obviously destroyed or were missing as previously 
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mentioned.  Of the files that remain, the contents of a few were deemed as matter of 
National Security, and they have not been released by departments with in the ministries 
list above and are not vetted.145  The new Czech state security that is employed under the 
Ministry of the Interior, who may or may not still have former StB agents, decides which 
files to release for vetting and research and which to withhold.  In fact, two years ago, 
when the military intelligence was combined, multiple bags of files were discovered in an 
old basement of the military counter intelligence facility with a sign on them to please 
shred.146  According to an interview conducted by this author with the Ministry of 
Interior, once a person has been vetted through the StB files and is cleared, they would 
not be reviewed again.147   
In February of this year a new government institution was established.  The 
Institute of Totalitarian Regimes has finally compiled all existing secret police files, 
except those in the interest of national security.  They are under the process of filing them 
into an electronic database to allow for research to be conducted and lustration 
certificated to be issued more accurately and faster.  All members of this institution have 
been vetted and cleared for ties with the StB, if they are old enough, prior to employment.  
With all the files in one place this institution will help prevent the issuing of false 
certificates, as in a few cases of the past, and more importantly allow historians and 
journalist to present an accurate account of the past. 
Upon the separation of the Czech and Slovak Republics in 1993, Slovakia 
discontinued their lustration procedures. 
C. COLLAPSE OF EAST GERMANY AND UNIFICATION 
As mentioned earlier, East Germany retained its hard-line approach to reforms in 
the late 1980s ignoring Gorbachev’s policy of glasnost.  In 1989, as the communist 
regimes throughout East Central Europe were breaking down, Erich Honecker, General 
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Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, continued to rule with an 
iron fist.  In the summer of that same year Poland held their first free elections and 
opened the eyes of the rest of the Warsaw Pact nations.  East Germans were trying 
anything to find their way out of the republic.  They were camped out at the West 
German Embassies in Prague, Warsaw and Budapest trying to escape to the West.  The 
trains carrying these individuals to the Federal Republic of Germany (FDR) were 
assaulted by thousands of people in Dresden also trying to get out. 148  In addition, an 
estimated fifteen to twenty thousand East German citizens crossed the border into Austria 
from Hungary that summer.149           
Demonstrations emerged and as the summer continued on they also continued to 
grow in size.  The revolution in East Germany was underway.  By the end of the summer 
hundreds of thousands were protesting weekly.   One demonstrator commented, “There 
were tears in my eyes. I did not feel alone; we learned to stand upright….The spell-fear 
of the Stasi-was broken.”150  Demonstrations on  October 7, the fortieth anniversary of 
the GDR, led to a violent crackdown by police, but this did not stop the people.  Less 
than a month later over 500,000 demonstrators protested in Berlin.  Five days later, on 
November 9, 1989, the wall fell.151             
The destruction of the Berlin Wall in November of 1989 reunited families and old 
friends.  Officially, enemies became allies.  It began the reunification process of East and 
West Germany foreseen by Article 23 of the Basic Law.  As hundreds of thousands of 
people rejoiced, the conflict that had German level weapons at fellow Germans began its 
passage into memory.  Once more, as in the years 1846-1871, the Germanys were 
resolved in unity, but this time there was no bloodshed and no rupture in the balance of 
power in Europe.  These Germans spoke the same language, ate relatively the same food, 
and culturally maintained the same traditions; it had only been forty-five years since they 
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were one nation.  But these people had grown apart since the wall was established.  They 
grew up under vastly different social conditions and structures, not the least in the aspect 
that West Germany had truly rid itself of the fear of the secret police.152  Many in the 
East lived their lives in fear or always questioning those around them while those in the 
West experienced freedom of expression and movement.  A majority of these populations 
had only known each other as an enemy or as a matter of total indifference.  There was a 
completely different mindset in the East than in the West.   
East Germany had filled the minds of their citizens with propaganda for years 
through mass media and education concerning the evils of the West, while at the same 
time East Germans had also watched West German television.  After the construction of 
the wall in 1961, “East German party theoreticians warned of a West German revanchist 
onslaught under the NATO compass and Nazi war flag.  Once the atomic fires had 
subsided, the West German imperialists would emerge from their Bundeswehr armored 
personnel carriers to enslave the workers and peasants of the other Germany and once 
more erect the charnel houses of the Nazi Volksgemeinschaft.”153  Forty-five years of 
such propaganda filled the minds of the people and especially the soldiers of the east.  
Neither East nor West trusted each other.  This put the peoples of East Germany at a 
disadvantage as they not only had to deal with the ghosts of their communist past, but 
completely alter their way of thinking if they chose to continue employment in the new 
unified state and the Bundeswehr.   
Less than a year after the wall was demolished, Germany was unified.  On 3 
October, 1990, the “unification” law took affect.  In the past year the GDR had taken 
considerable steps towards reforming the nation.  The Stasi was disbanded formally, the 
first free elections ever in the GDR were conducted within months, and a coalition 
government of opposition forces and the former regime was formed.154  They even 
implemented lustration procedures in the judiciary and the government screening 
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deputies and ministers for past involvement with the Stasi.155  These reforms were 
meaningless as the FRG absorbed all state functions and institutions.      
Upon the assumption of the GDR into the FRG, all state security and law 
enforcement was disbanded or restructured under western control.  Members of West 
German organization replaced a majority of the senior stagg.  Judges and prosecutors 
were relieved from their duties until their West German supervisors vetted them.156  The 
NVA as an institution vanished on 2 October 1990, but its soldiers became members of 
the Bundeswehr, and there followed a stage reduction of force among mostly officers and 
some NCOs in the next four or five years.157  East German soldiers were allowed to 
remain and join the Bundeswehr, but were not allowed to command in the “senior 
echelons.”158  All of the NCOs and Officers that requested permanent status in the 
Bundeswehr were vetted for previous ties to the Ministry for State Security (MfS).  This 
process resulted in the discovery of many informants among the ranks, a case made more 
extreme when the soldier under scrutiny had omitted to mention their prior collaboration 
with the Stasi.  As the MfS archives were reviewed it was found that one in every five 
was deemed an “unofficial agent” of the MfS.159  The border patrol of East Germany, 
employing a high percentage of the MfS, was completely dismantled and assumed by the 
West German Bundesgrenzschutz.160  Under the management of a handful of 
Bundeswehr officers, the former border guards took down the wall in a lightning action 
that left almost no trace of what been for forty years the most important piece of 
architecture in modern German history.      
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D. VERGANGENHEITSBEWALTIGUNG 
For the second time in less than fifty years, Germans found themselves being 
“cleansed” again for serving the ruling regime and obeying their laws.  Although 
originally deemed as unnecessary by Chancellor Helmut Kohl, not the least bit the factor 
of the former East German opposition in the government, Transitional Justice in 
Germany was implemented very shortly after unification.  The unified Germany adopted 
the three methods of transitional justice or Vergangenheitsbewaltigung, coming to grips 
with the past.161  One of the methods utilized was Enquetekommission or Truth 
Commissions.  Germany was the only former communist nation to implement Truth 
Commissions as a measure of transitional justice.  Once Germany was reunified there 
were millions of citizens from the western half who were completely unaware of the 
severity of the crimes committed by the SED and the Stasi.  The Truth Commissions, not 
focused on the individual’s responsibility in the former regime, but rather the crimes that 
were committed in general, provided an understanding and an accurate picture of the 
policies and procedures used by the GDR over the last forty-five years to maintain 
control of its population.162  Both civil and governmental institutions were examined to 
include the church, prisons, justice system, and the Stasi in order to provide a better 
understanding of “what a cog in the machine each person was.”  As a result of the 
hearings conducted, two detailed reports were released but the population paid little 
attention to them.163 
The second form of transitional justice Germany employed was Trials.  While on 
trial for murder, Erich Honecker claimed that, “What is achieved in this trial is exactly 
what we [the Communists] were always accused of doing, ridding oneself of political 
foes by the means of criminal law, but, of course, all within the rule of law.”164  
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Controversy surrounded the trials as people debated the question of under which laws 
should the criminals be tried, East German or West German?  It would be impossible to 
apply West German law as those accused were not subject to it at the time.  According to 
the unification treaty all individual crimes committed in the GDR prior to unification, 
would be punished under GDR law.165  This controversy came into light in 1992 when 
the East German border guards who were responsible for shooting defectors went to trial.  
German courts ruled that the “shoot to kill” orders violated the Helsinki Accords and UN 
covenants on human rights according to the “right to life and the right to freedom of 
movement.”  Many of the accused claimed they were only following orders as illegally 
crossing the border was a criminal act to which they were required to prevent.  A 
majority of the border guards were individually selected according to the fact that they 
would most likely not question any orders they were given.  But the courts claimed that 
the soldiers should have known better than to shoot unarmed civilians.166  In the 2,668167 
investigations concerning the attempted murder and actual murder of defectors, the 
majority of the soldiers found guilty received suspended sentences, but those in the 
positions of authority served jail time.168            
The last Secretary of the GDR, Egon Krenz, tried to use the same law abiding 
excuse when he was tried in 1997, proclaiming he was innocent.  Ultimately, he was 
found guilty and sentenced to six and a half years of prison.169  Charges were also 
brought up on Honecker for the death of the defectors, but the case was dismissed due to 
his poor health.   Additional members of the Defense Committee and the Politburo were 
also tried on the same accounts and found guilty. 170  Erich Mielke was found guilty on 
two counts of murder prior to 1945 and sentenced to six years in prison, of which he 
served a little over three years.  He was not found guilty for any crimes committed while 
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he was head of the Stasi for over 30 years.171  Thousands of investigations were launched 
by the Germany government concerning GDRs involvement in “murder, attempted 
murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, election fraud, and perversion of justice.”  Of the 
52,050 investigations launched in the former GDR, over half were dropped due to 
insufficient evidence and aging suspects.  Only 132 individuals of the 52,050 were 
convicted.172   
These investigations and trials addressed the crimes already mentioned above but 
did not address the thousands of individuals that were persecuted as political enemies of 
the state.  These East German political prisoners were only exercising the right that their 
western half practiced daily – freedom of expression.  They spent years in prison, were 
separated from loved ones, lost their jobs and prestige, and lived out the rest of their lives 
in fear.  Even crimes such as spreading propaganda earned an individual a year or two in 
prison.  One young man was sent to prison for hanging a sign in the window of his 
apartment that read, “When justice is turned into injustice, resistance becomes an 
obligation!”  He was rewarded with a trip to prison for almost two years.  Another young 
East German was committed to eighteen months of hard labor after a friend reported him 
to officials for stating that tanks did not belong at the borders.173  Many of the Stasi 
agents were never tried for imprisoning, torturing, or influencing the employment of 
these political prisoners.  For those individuals that suffered at the hand of the Stasi and 
those that collaborated with them, Lustration, there was an attempt at providing justice.    
“East Germans may have had full employment and bread, but what is this to 
persons stripped of their dignity because they could not read, travel, or go to church for 
fear of losing privileges or risking imprisonment?  What then is wrong with barring 
persons who profited from this system from holding positions of public responsibility and 
trust in a democratic Rechstaat?”174   
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The last form of transitional justice discussed in Germany was Lustration.  In 
accordance with the Unification Treaty, Stasi agents, their collaborators, and members of 
the SED were considered “unsuitable people to continue occupying positions of trust and 
public responsibility in the new order.”  These positions of trust were not only within the 
legislative, executive, or judiciary branches of the government but also included state 
employees such as “teachers and police officers.” 175  All of these individuals, to include 
lawyers, church employees, managers of private enterprises, were investigated by their 
employer without consent for ties with the Stasi.176  Like the Truth Commissions, 
Germany was the only East Central Europe nation to conduct vetting outside of top-level 
government positions. 177  Even janitors and secretaries of public institutions and postal 
workers could be excluded from employment for fifteen years if their employer thought 
their past connections with the Secret Police warranted dismissal.178  In accordance with 
the unification treaty over 250,000 state employees were laid off until they were properly 
vetted for ties with the Stasi.  Employment of academics of law, economics, and social 
sciences was immediately annulled with less than five percent returning to their job.179  
Over all, 400,000 people were screened for ties, four percent of the East German 
population, and only three percent were found guilty.180    
The screening of these individuals was conducted through the use of the files that 
were kept in the archives of the Stasi.  Although many files were burned or shredded in 
the final days of the Stasi, there were over six million individual files that were placed 
under the control of Joachim Gauck.  His commission was responsible for investigating 
the files and submitting reports to employers that “contained the code name of the 
informer, where and for how long she worked, whether she signed a declaration of 
commitment, why she was recruited, whether she received payments, rewards, or awards 
for the work, how the work ended, how many reports she wrote, and some information on 
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the contents of the reports.”181  According to the law on Stasi files, if a person was a 
minor or serving in the military during the period of their collaboration, and as long as 
they did not report on anyone, their record would return clean to their employer.  This 
law also includes a statute of limitations on collaboration where an individual would also 
be found to have a negative report if their collaboration preceded 1975.  But, their file 
would be forwarded if they committed a crime or “violation of basic principles of 
humanity.”182    
The files were used not only for legal prosecution but to provide a better 
understanding of what happened through those years and how the “Stasi operated, and the 
numerous collaborators that it attracted may be important as an educational process in 
creating a stronger open and democratic personality among citizens.  For people 
emerging from societies that have been built on “forgetting” atrocities of the past, a new 
beginning could not be appropriately made by perpetuating the fatal habit.”183  It was 
argued that the files were used to “continue the disintegration and exclusion of the eastern 
intellectual elite, whose democratic but often socialist views were displeasing to the SED 
hierarchy but also do not seemed to be particularly congenial to the prevailing doctrines 
of the Federal Republic.184 
The problem with the lustration process in Germany and the Czech Republic is 
that it punishes certain members of society as a group.  This collective punishment does 
not take into account an individual’s actions during the regime, only their association 
with the specified group.185  It also assumed that those that were top members of the 
communist party assumed their positions based on their loyalty to the party and was not 
based on the individuals’ qualifications themselves.186  When it comes to collaboration 
the law does allow the employer to make their own assessment as to the individuals’ 
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performance and argue their case.  In the GDR it was a crime not to inform on your 
fellow citizen, punishable to five years in prison.  One individual served almost two years 
in jail for not reporting that his friend was planning to defect.187        
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IV. POLAND’S ROAD TO TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE  
The question remains; How does a nation deal with its broken past and the legacy 
of barbarism in the midst of Twentieth Century civilization?  Some thought an 
International Tribunal should be formed to prosecute former Communists, such as 
Lithuanian President Landsbergis.  Others believed it was an issue for the individual 
state.  Simon Wiesenthal, famous Nazi hunter author of The Sunflower, commented, “It is 
important that each of the former communist countries come to grips with its own 
history; and therefore they must put their own house in order, and not with some kind of 
international tribunal.”188  This is contradictory to the Nuremberg Trials.  Every state 
followed a separate path since falling under the authority of Moscow, although they were 
oppressed under many of the same conditions.  Therefore, each state should develop its 
own system of justice.  In Poland this system was the legislation of lustration.  But it was 
not legalized until 1997.    
By the mid 1980s, in the face of the Solidarity movement, the Communist 
government emplaced many reforms in Poland.  Society was moving towards a more 
democratic and limited free nation.  The government had become quite liberal; the people 
were given the right to protest.189  “The Polish leaders from the communist era gained 
legitimacy as center-left politicians quite early, as long as they embraced democratic and 
capitalist change.”190  These reforms established Poland as the vanguard in the collapse 
of communist East Central Europe in 1989-1991.  As regimes began to topple, following 
Poland’s spring elections in 1989, business in Poland continued as usual, progressing 
towards a free society.  There was no immediate discourse to round up the old regime and 
begin persecutions.  In fact, the “Round Table” agreements of 1989 were completely 
against such measures. 
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A. ROUND TABLE TALKS 
Poland’s turnover of power was a negotiated one.  According to the agreements 
made during the Round Table talks, members of the Communist regime were allowed to 
remain within the government, while Solidarity took the lead of running the nation.  
These agreements allowed both the Communist party and the Solidarity movement to 
form a more “freely elected Senate.”  In the parliamentary elections of 1989, Solidarity 
took almost all of the available Senate seats; the Communist Party was able to keep one 
in the Senate (today they hold close to 13%).  The Round Table allowed for a slow 
withdrawal of the communist party’s involvement in the new Polish government.  The 
communists remained in control of the defense and internal affairs ministries until 1990 
with Jaruzelski as President until December of 1990.191  Another agreement of the Round 
Table which led to the delay of lustration in Poland stated that the previous regime’s 
government would not be held accountable for crimes against the Polish nation.  “This 
confirmed the argument that lustration was likely to be less severe in liberal communist 
systems which had negotiated their exit away from authoritarianism peacefully.”192   
In 1989 Poland’s incumbent Prime Minister, Tahdeous Mazoweiecki did not 
assist his country’s search for historical justice.  He claimed that he was going to draw a 
“Thick Line,” and forgive the communist past to allow for “reconciliation and 
transformation.”193  Mazowiecki’s policy did not allow purging or lustration.  Apparently 
this deal was made with the communists to allow the negotiations of the “Round Table” 
to continue.194  Mazowiecki claimed that he “simply intended to symbolically divide the 
old and new Poland and to separate his government’s responsibility from that of the 
previous regime.”    
The “Round Table” agreements began the delay of the Lustration process in 
Poland.  Mazowiecki believed his idea provided movement in the right direction for 
                                                 
191 Szczerbiak, 555-556. 
192 George Sanford, Democratic Government in Poland: Constitutional Politics since 1989, NY: 
Palgrave MacMillan, 2002, 220. 
193 Szczerbiak, 556. 
194 Rosenberg, 235. 
 47
Poland to maintain a stabilized economy and government during this time of transition.  
Lustration and purges would only lead to political unrest and further decline of the 
already struggling economy.195  In contrast to Czechoslovakia, “Historical Justice” would 
just have to wait for the day when Poland achieves both economic and political security.  
The idea of Poland delaying lustration to allow for the development of the nation seemed 
to accommodate the previous regime.  There were active members of the government 
who did have a clean slate.  Senator Zbigniew Romaszewski, the current Vice President 
of the Senate, started his career in politics in 1976.  Minus a two year stint in jail as a 
political prisoner in the 1980s, he remained active in the Solidarity movement and 
politics until he was elected to the Senate in 1989.  He has remained a strong activist for 
human rights and lustration.  To date he is the only Senator to be elected seven 
consecutive times.196  Senator Romaszewski did not stand alone when it came to a clean 
past.  There were others who could have stepped up to meet the needs of the state.  
Lustration legislation in 1989 was viable, but the transition was negotiated by the former 
communist regime and those members of Solidarity that the communist chose to take part 
in the Round Table agreements.197    
B. WILD LUSTRATION 
Unofficially, lustration began rather quickly and made its appearance as soon as 
Mazowiecki left office in 1991.198  The new Prime Minister, Jan Olszewski, promised, 
while campaigning for elections, that the policy of the “Thick Line” would be abolished 
and major anti-communism reforms would take place once he was elected.   The Sejm, 
the Polish parliament, passed new legislation in May of 1992, “requiring information 
about current senior public officials occupying the rank of provincial governor upwards 
who had co-operated with communist-era security services to be made public.”199  
Thanks to Poland’s new Interior Minister, Antoni Macierewicz, the secret police files of 
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sixty four Sejm deputies, listed as collaborators, were released to the Sejm.200  Soon 
after, Macierewicz produced an additional list with thirty-seven names of collaborators, 
which included the current President of Poland, Lech Walesa.  It is not surprising that the 
majority of the names on the new list were members of the opposition party, many of 
whom were key individuals in the fight for freedom the decade prior.  Former dissidents, 
like Walesa, parliamentary and public officials, and opposition activists were included on 
this list. 201  But the list was just that, a list.  It provided no information on the individuals 
and was used by Olszewski’s government for political gains.   
The Sejm looked into the claims of collaboration and discovered that a majority 
of them were false.  When confronted with this, Macierewicz claimed: “it wasn’t his job 
to check the evidence.”202  Upon further research, it was found that the names recorded 
were only names in the archives and no evidence existed as to whether they had 
collaborated or not.203  These unreliable claims embedded doubt in the minds of the 
government of the legitimacy of the files, the peoples who reported it, and the lustration 
process itself.  The list was released on June 4, 1992.  The Olszewski government was 
“ousted” the next day, on of June 5.204  Macierewicz’s mess led to the defeat of the 
Olszewski government205 and contributed to the Communist party winning parliamentary 
elections in 1993.  “They themselves had brought down the last Solidarity coalition 
government and handed the 1993 communist election to the former communist by 
refusing to work together.”206       
Now that the Communists were openly operating and participating in the 
parliament, the “Thick Line” didn’t seem like a bad idea; “it perfectly illustrated why it 
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was the correct policy.”207  Lustration seemed to fade away from politics and public life, 
partly due to the communist involvement in politics, and became close to a dead issue.  
Unfortunately, it was brought back to manipulate political objectives.  In November of 
1995, President Walesa, a previous victim of false lustration claims, announced that the 
newly elected Prime Minister Jozef Olesky, was a “long-time informant of a ‘foreign 
intelligence service’.”208   As the defeated president spent his final days in office, the 
Ministry of the Interior and the Sejm investigated these allegations.  Olesky was found 
guilty of working with the KGB and the opposition demanded his resignation.209  
“Lustration as a tool for “political infighting”210 was rising again.   
C. LUSTRATION ACT 1997 
Under the new administration of President Aleksander Kwasniewski in 1996, 
lustration was considered the “most important problem which needs to be solved.”211  
Public polls conducted in February of 1996 reiterated this idea with 67% of those polled 
agreeing that lustration was necessary.212  After almost ten years of delay and “wild 
lustration,” the formal lustration law was passed in 1997.  Justification for this law was 
comprised of three key ideas: “a desire for openness in public life and the notion that 
citizens had a right to know the backgrounds of their public representatives.”213  It wasn’t 
against the law to have collaborated with the secret police.  It was just the public’s right 
to know this information.  Secondly, it was in the interest of national security that any 
past relations with the secret police be released to the public.  This would prevent the 
possibility of a government officials becoming vulnerable to coercion or blackmail.  
Currently this information is still not available, allowing for political blackmail to occur. 
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And finally, the law protected each individual against “wild lustration,” de-politicizing 
the records and subjecting them and the individual to judicial process.214  The judicial 
process was not impartial, as many judges who were previously employed by the 
communists still presided in the courts. 
The Lustration Act required all candidates running for public office to submit a 
letter stating whether or not they had collaborated with the secret police.  No penalties 
were directed at the individual, nor were they disqualified from their job if they admitted 
to collaboration.  If the individual lied about their involvement and his or her declaration 
was later discovered to be false, he or she could be precluded from public office for ten 
years.215  The Lustration Act also did not preclude former communist party members 
from participating in public office.216   
With the laws now in place, the public seemed to lose interest.  Polls were taken 
of the general populace in 1994 that showed almost three quarters of the population was 
in favor of elected officials being removed from office if they were found to have 
collaborated with secret service.  In 1999, that percentage dropped to a little over half of 
the populace.217  In 2001, “Robert Soltyk, deputy foreign editor with the Gazeta 
Wyborcza newspaper stated: ‘I don't think it's a great idea. When you look to the past 
through the window of the ex-special police, you don't really look into the past, you look 
into the past as produced by them. They were not honest people.  They were inventing 
people and trying to use the files for their own purposes.’”218  This is a common 
perception by many citizens of Eastern Europe and the rest of the Western World.  But 
the independent organizations now responsible for these files say the “invention of 
people” was a rarity.       
As part of the 1997 law, the Institute for National Remembrance (Instytucie 
Pamieci Narodowej – IPN), the commission for the prosecution of crimes against the 
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Polish Nation, was established in 1998.  Not in operation until July of 2000, the institute’s 
main mission was to “preserve the memory of” the citizens’ fight for an independent Polish 
Nation against its Nazi and Communist oppressors and to “prosecute crimes against peace, 
humanity, and specific war crimes.”219  This independent organization, separate from the 
government, was designed to maintain neutrality and prevent governmental influence.  The 
IPN is responsible for maintaining the secret police files and researching the files for the 
lustration “vetting” process.  In an interview conducted on 15 April 2008, the validity of the 
files was discussed by the author with Dr Krysztof Persak and Dr Wladslaw Bulhak (IPN 
research historians).  The fact that many of the files, including the ones on the Solidarity 
movement, have been destroyed or are missing was not debated.  There were also files 
deemed “classified” by many of the heads of agencies, such as the Ministry of Defense, and 
were not released to the IPN as directed.  The Security Services retained all of their files until 
1999 and still maintains a collection of files.220 
Dr Persak and Dr Bulhak, from the IPN claim, that it is very rare to find false files 
within the system.  The old communist system was very redundant with card files, officer 
reports, registration books, recruiting documents, and personal declarations.  Even if 
individual files were destroyed or missing, this system provided for the additional documents 
mentioned above to determine one’s guilt.  Moreover, if the file of a collaborator was 
missing, there would still be a record of their collaboration in the files of the people on whom 
they were reporting.  Receipts of gifts to informers were also kept in the files.  The SB was 
very meticulous in their documentation of victims and collaborators.  Almost every 
collaborator was recruited for a specific purpose and they were reviewed and accepted by the 
recruiting agent’s supervisor.  The supervisor was also responsible for ensuring that the new 
collaborator actually existed.221  It was a very bureaucratic system.  These notions are also 
supported by the director of a similar institution in the Czech Republic.  It is possible for an 
individual’s name to be entered into the system as a collaborator without ever having 
provided any information.  Usually this was noted in the file and registration books.  It is 
                                                 
219 “Origin of the Institute of National Remembrance.” 
220 Dr Krysztof Persak and Dr Wladslaw Bulhak, Public Education Office, Institute of National 
Remembrance Poland, Interview by author, April 15, 2008, Warsaw, Poland. 
221 Persak and Bulhak Interview. 
 52
possible that an agent who was eager to please their boss registered names. But this 
situation, according to the IPN, was very rare and most unlikely. 
RESURFACING OF POLITICAL INFIGHTING 
In 2005 the Law and Justice Party (PiS), lead by Jaroslaw Kaczynski, won the 
majority in parliament.  Jaroslaw’s twin brother Lech Kaczynski was elected to president 
at the same time.  This campaign focused on the “cleansing of Poland’s past.”  It is 
rumored that their harsh position on lustration was used as a tool to punish the members 
of the Solidarity Party who may have slighted the twin brothers during the 1990s.222  
“Driven by resentment against an entire generation of older politicians, the Kaczynski are 
happy to see them purged from offices and replaced by their own loyalists.”223  The 
Lustration Act of 1997 expired on 15 March 2007.  The previous law, thought to be too 
narrow by the President and the new Prime Minister, Jaroslaw Kaczynski, only accounted 
for 27,000 members of the Polish population.224  A new law developed by the 
Kaczynski’s Law and Justice Party expanded the range and number of individuals that 
would be subject to the vetting process.  This new law would apply not only to public 
officials as in the past, but to anyone in a public position of authority including 
academics, journalist, and company executives, much like in Germany.   
Every individual holding a position listed under the law who was born after 
September of 1971 would be required to submit an affidavit as to their involvement with 
the secret police.225  Those who were born in September of 1971 were eighteen at the 
time of the collapse of the Communist Regime.  In the final years of the previous regime 
how much damage could a teenager inflict upon society?  There were many youth 
organizations throughout the country. Although many of them were not related to 
dissident movements, the network of informers most likely penetrated all of them.  The 
new law is estimated to effect up to 700,000 individuals and it could take up to 15 years 
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for all the affidavits to be processed and cleared if all the affidavits were reviewed. 226  Is 
this “Historical reckoning” or a “witch hunt masquerading as a quest for the truth”?227   
Lustration is still used as a political tool by members of the current ruling 
government, but to a lesser extent.  In the past two to three years, many members of the 
secret service and military intelligence were vetted and a complete reworking of these 
institutions was executed.  Often the new government believed that members of the secret 
service and military intelligence still worked for the former party.  This was also the case 
with heads of the ministries and state institutions.  With the election of a new 
government, new individuals were appointed to lead these institutions.  Lustration in 
Poland is viewed by much of the public as just another government issue.  Public polls 
taken in 2006 noted that 70% of the population believed lustration was used as a tool by 
the ruling political party rather than a tool to provide justice to the people.  This was 
echoed by the opposition party with a result of 84% in agreement with the public’s 
perception and surprisingly over 50% of the ruling party also agreed.228          
PROTECTORSHIP OF THE PEOPLE - THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 
Lustration’s popularity was dying out after the election of Lech Kaczynski.  It was 
brought back into the public’s eye in January of 2007 with the scandal in the Polish 
Catholic Church concerning Bishop Stanislaw Wieglus’ status as a collaborator with the 
secret police.  Although neither the current or past lustration law applies to members of 
the clergy, this case touched many of the citizens in Poland and revised interest in the 
need for a continuation of the law.   
During the period of the old regime, the Catholic Church was a symbol of 
freedom and a separate organization for the rights of its citizens.  During communist rule 
the church seemed to be the only moral authority the people could turn to in trust when 
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they thought there was no other hope.229  The Catholic Church was the voice of the 
people when the people could not have a voice of their own.  Unfortunately the Church, 
like many other organizations in Poland striving for a free society, was also infiltrated 
with secret police and their collaborators.  The Catholic Church was the sworn enemy of 
the state.  The Communist Party and the SB carefully filled the church with its spies over 
the years.  Many priests were arrested due to compromising material, then interrogated 
and intimidated into cooperation.  In 1949 the “patriot priest” movement was established 
with the aim at destroying the Church from within.230  As an example, the SB infiltrated 
pilgrimages in 1978 from Warsaw to Jasna Gora.  During these pilgrimages, agents 
planted controversial material concerning the church and pornographic material on the 
participants and served them hallucinogenic drugs.231  These actions of course led to 
arrests and intimidation of the participants in the future.        
In 1995 Father Konrad Stanislaw Hejmo was accused of collaborating with the 
secret police.  The former aide to Pope John Paul II denied all claims against him.  
Research was conducted through the IPN and the claims were presented to Father Maciej 
Zieba, the priest’s Dominican superior who claimed “the files were convincing and 
shocking.”232  A warning was given by Bishop Tadeusz Pieronek, “We are still not sure 
of the type of the co-operation, whether he was simply talking about the Holy Father with 
the secret services or was actually providing secret information on him.”233  
Last year Bishop Stanislaw Wielgus, soon to be the next Archbishop of Warsaw, 
was accused of collaborating with the SB in Poland.  He admitted to working with the 
secret police,234 but denied that he ever informed on anyone, only using the connection to 
obtain foreign travel.  Public opinion and polls showed that the population wanted him 
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removed from his position.235  He resigned his appointment immediately as the 
Archbishop of Warsaw.  Research of the files revealed his connections with the SB ran 
much deeper than he admitted.   
D. 2007 — AN AWAKENING 
With the shocking scandal in the Catholic Church blasted across the front pages 
of the news, lustration became an issue once again in the lives of the citizen.  This time 
support for legislation swung in the opposite direction.  As legislation came under review 
from the Constitutional Court, much controversy arose concerning the number and 
occupations of individuals who would now fall under the new lustration legislation.  The 
bulk of this controversy was centered on the application of lustration to private 
enterprises and institutions.  Many of the privately owned academic institutions and news 
agencies who fell under the umbrella of this new law felt the government should have no 
say in who they employ.  Numerous individuals, organizations, and institutions called for 
a boycott of the new law, including Warsaw University.236           
On May 11, 2007, the Constitutional Court ruled that the proposed Lustration 
Law was unconstitutional: 
While eliminating the communist totalitarian heritage, a democratic state 
based on the rule of law must use the formal legal means which could be 
accepted in the framework of axiology of such a state.  No other means 
can be accepted because such a sate would not be better than a typical 
totalitarian regime, which must be eliminated.  A democratic state ruled by 
law has sufficient legal instruments necessary to guarantee justice and to 
punish the people who committed crimes.  A law which is based on the 
idea of revenge cannot be accepted in a democratic state.237     
The Constitutional Court claimed that it was unconstitutional for a journalist to be 
vetted under the current lustration law and pointed out that the law failed to clearly 
identify “who” a journalist was.  It also cleared scholars and employees of private 
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enterprises.  What it did not prevent was the vetting of directors and appointed officials of 
media agencies and public institutions.  According to the new law, all individuals holding 
positions slated for vetting were required to fill out new lustration forms stating their 
previous involvement with the secret police by December of 2007.  No new cases have 
been presented in court for the 100–200,000 individuals that may have submitted an 
affidavit.238     
The new law of 2007 still fails to provide substance.  The fact still remains that 
many of the employees of the state have admitted to collaboration and still remain in their 
positions.  It is only when they lie and are discovered that this becomes an issue.  In a 
2007 poll conducted by Centrum Badania Opinii Spolecznej (CBOS), Poland’s Public 
Opinion Research Center (see Figure 1), 62% of the people polled believe that those who 
collaborated with the secret police should be relieved of their duties in public 
positions.239  In the interview conducted with the IPN it was the personal opinion of one 
of the members that this legislation was not a good tool for coming to terms with the past.  
It provides no information on the crimes committed and “doesn’t say anything about the 
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Figure 1.   Public opinion polls concerning employment of collaborators in Poland  
A positive aspect about the new law is the increased responsibility of the Institute 
of National Remembrance (IPN).  They have been authorized to allow journalists and 
historians almost unlimited access to all the secret police files they maintain.  The 
information detailed in the archive is beginning to be released to journalists and 
historians, who will hopefully use the information in the files to develop an accurate 
history, once concealed in the past, and reveal it to the public.241  Pawel Pierkarski, 
former director of the office of Senator Romaszewski, believes that this information will 
help the people understand what collaboration entailed and the many circumstances 
fellow citizens encountered leading them to cooperate with the secret police.  When 
asked if this would finally provide justice for the people, the response was similar to 
those facing the same dilemma throughout the world.  “It depends on the individual 
citizen.”242    
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The IPN has also been given permission to produce a number of lists to be 
displayed over their internet web page.   The lists compiled to date are: (1) Peoples who 
were oppressed as a result of the secret police.  These individuals or family members 
must approve their name prior to posting.  (2) Individuals who held positions within the 
Communist Party.  This list has nothing to do with lustration.   
One list that was deemed as “unconstitutional” by the Constitutional Court was 
the list of secret collaborators and it is not displayed.  The IPN is also constructing lists of 
those subject to the law currently filling public positions, posting their information on the 
internet.  This information is being posted on their website and will contain a copy of 
their files in the future.243  In the near future anyone will be able to view the secret police 
documents on their public officials.  These lists may provide the public a peace of mind 
concerning their government and open the eyes of the younger generation on the many 
victims of state oppression, but it is just information.  There is no analysis.  It is only 
information posted on a web page viewed only by those with internet access and an 
interest in the subject matter.   
Instead of integrity in public life, we saw purges in administration and 
political nominations on all levels of government.  We were to see a 
decisive battle against the ‘post communist mafia’, but the only mafia that 
was discovered was the one in the heart of the PiS government.  Instead of 
a crackdown on crime, we saw brutal tactics employed against court 
judges, the Constitutional Tribunal, and disobedient prosecutors. 
— Adam Michnik, director-in-chief of Gazeta Wyborscza (Polish 
Newspaper known for its dissident opinions), on the past two years under 
the Kaczynski government244 
In October of 2007, Poland elected a new Prime Minister of Poland, Donald Tusk.  
The Civic Platform (PO), now led by PM Tusk, received a fifteen percent lead over the 
PiS government in the elections.  Voter turnout reached as high as 70% in Warsaw.245  
Where as the PiS government was elected to power in 2005 because the people were tired 
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of government scandals concerning previous communist ties,246 it is assumed that the 
people of Poland today were tired of the Kaczynskis and their “aggression in domestic 
politics and the souring of ties with Moscow and Brussels.”247  The same sentiments 
were noted in an interview by this author with of one Poland’s government employees 
who claimed that the “people were sick of the Kaczynskis.  A year was enough.  They did 
not do enough for the economy and their policies (of lustration) were too wide spread.”  
In a 2007 poll conducted by CBOS (see Figure 2) almost 70% of those polled believed 
that lustration was still a tool for politicians, while 19% believed that lustration and the 
content of the files was the most important topic that the government needed to 
address.248  Although Donald Tusk ran on a campaign directed against the Kaczynskis’ 
policies during the past two years, there was one decision/policy that remained the same: 
the need to maintain the legislation concerning lustration.249    
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V. CONCLUSION  
A. RECOMMENDATION 
The questions addressed to many Polish citizens concerning the model of transitional 
justice selected by the government at the time of transition are: Was this the right approach 
for Poland and why did Poland choose not to follow the Czech or German models?  For 
many people these questions were a moot point.  Just as in 1989, the Polish believe the past 
cannot be changed and it is the future that must be addressed.  At the IPN there are over two 
million files on collaborators and agents that span over 86,000 meters.250  There are a few 
gaps in the data and a few files are still kept at the Ministry of Interior deemed to be a matter 
of National Security.  These files for the most part could have provided the proof, if required, 
to support cases against individuals.  Therefore, the notion of conducting a Truth 
Commission was not practicable.  The East German model of Lustration vetted all public 
employees and allowed for the complete opening of the secret police files.  This led to 
thousands of employees losing their jobs.251  This model was able to work for Germany as 
only half of the nation public officials were being dismissed.  In Poland there was no western 
half of the state to pick up the pieces of the broken institutions and maintain governance, as 
in Germany. 
If Poland could start over, it would be recommended that a combination of their 
current lustration law, the Czech lustration law, and the German process of trials and opening 
of files would prevent the long and drawn out process that they have experienced over the 
past eighteen years.  It has been argued that the economic standing and developing of the 
nation were not only a higher priority than justice, but a requirement.  An argument to this is 
ideology is that the Czech Republic initiated tough lustration from the beginning without 
occurring major damage to its economic and governmental institutions.  Such lustration, if 
vetted appropriately could have been applied to Poland immediately.  The opening of files 
would have prevented the “wild lustration” and their use as a political tool.   
                                                 
250 Persak and Bulhak. 
251 Rigby, 114-115. 
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Poland’s current law allows for individuals that collaborated with the secret 
service to still remain in positions of authority throughout the government and civil 
society, as long as they admit to collaboration.  The fact of collaboration is available to 
every voter prior to the election of such officials, but not the extent of such collaboration.  
Poland is moving forward with posting the content of files on elected and appointed 
officials on the internet, via the IPN.  But this information is currently not posted until 
that individual has already taken their appropriate seat.  If the information in the files is 
going to be released to the public after the election and appointment, it should be 
available to voters prior to the election to allow the people to make an informed decision.  
It is also recommended that all affidavits be reviewed for the extent of collaboration and 
damage that was inflicted on the Polish Nation, whether or not the claim of collaboration 
was true.          
In the eyes of many victims, justice may never come and they will only find peace 
upon death.  What is left in Poland that represents the terror and hardships they lived with 
daily in Poland?  In Budapest there is the Terror Haza (museum of Nazi and Communist 
atrocities), in Romania the Sighet Memorial, and in Prague there is an eerie Memorial to 
the Victims of Communism and the Museum of Communism.  Even in Washington, D.C. 
there is a monument and a memorial foundation to the victims of communism.  Poland 
honors the Warsaw Uprising of 1944 with a world class museum.  An additional museum 
has been made of the prison that held the Polish resistance fighters under the Nazi 
occupation.  The old Gestapo headquarters in Warsaw also serves as a museum 
displaying the tortures that the political prisoners received.  There are also monuments 
and plaques all over the city to remember the destiny that faced Poland’s Jewish 
population during Nazi occupation.  The Palace of Culture and Science will remind those 
that can remember the horrors of the past, but what of the future generations to come?  
Poland needs to erect a memorial and/or museum dedicated to the victims for not only 
closure but for historical and educational means.  If the victims cannot find peace in 
justice, maybe they will find it knowing that their story will be heard and remembered. 
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B. CONCLUSION 
In the end, there is no tried-and-true solution to ridding a regime of the 
vestiges of its totalitarian past.  The key is to do something. 
— Fredo Arias-King, Founder of Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of 
Post-Soviet Democratization 
Eighteen years have passed since the Round Table.  For decades the Poles lived 
their lives in terror, withdrawing themselves from public life.  Those that did not, usually 
paid for this choice with their lives.  Individuals may have had very few friends, as many 
so-called friends reported information to the Secret Police for a periods for periods of 
time ranging from weeks to years.  This darkness seems to be a generational issue.  Many 
Polish citizens aged in their 30s remember having nothing as a child and adolescent.  
Still, they want to move forward and not be drawn back into the dark past of their 
childhood. There are others who were too young to remember the hardships and find 
themselves unable to relate to this issue.  There are even a few protests for the return of 
the Communist regime.  But there still remain those individuals who suffered atrocities 
and who still want justice.  They are ready to move forward, but not until the criminals 
have made restitution.   
The Polish government, for the many reasons already provided, has failed to 
deliver an adequate solution to its people concerning the years of oppression, terror, and 
violence they faced under the Communist Regime.   Due to almost a decade of denial and 
“wild lustration” the idea of providing true justice has continued to drag on.  Many 
throughout Poland may not believe that Lustration was the best approach, but it is making 
progress.  The half-hearted attempts by the Polish government have allowed for this issue 
to remain unsolved.  The new law concerning the opening of files and publication of lists 
is a step in the right direction, but I believe that the citizens have not reached this 
realization yet.  Until those responsible for the crimes against the people of Poland and 
the nation are held accountable, or they are too old to hold public office, this will 
continue to be an issue in Polish politics and society.         
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